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By Zachary Pearlman
Senior Law Clerk

Watkins v. Corbett (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 25, 2026)

If you litigate in Florida long enough, you learn one lesson about proposals for settlement: they are powerful, but they are unforgiving. The Second District’s decision in Watkins v. Corbett is a blunt reminder that courts demand strict compliance with both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442—and they will not rescue an otherwise “fair” offer that misses a technical requirement.

What Happened:

Richard and Jennifer Corbett sued Smith L. Watkins, alleging Watkins fraudulently induced them to buy her home by failing to disclose known defects. Watkins ultimately prevailed in the case. After winning, she sought attorney’s fees based on a proposal for settlement she had served on the Corbetts during the litigation.

Here’s the problem: Watkins served a joint proposal to two plaintiffs—Richard and Jennifer—but the proposal did not apportion the amount offered between them. The trial court denied fees, and the Second District affirmed.

The rule that did the damage: apportionment is mandatory

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) is clear: “A joint proposal must state the amount and terms attributable to each party.”

Because proposals for settlement create a fee entitlement “in derogation of the common law,” Florida courts strictly construe and enforce the requirements. In other words, close is not close enough.

Watkins argued that apportionment shouldn’t matter here because the Corbetts were married and owned the home as tenants by the entireties, so (as a practical matter) the case involved a “single” household interest. The Second District rejected that argument and reiterated that apportionment is a bright-line rule—and “there are no exceptions for claims brought by tenants by the entireties.”

“Even where no logical apportionment can be made…”

The most striking part of the opinion is the court’s emphasis that apportionment is required even when it feels artificial. Citing Florida Supreme Court authority, the court explained that “even where no logical apportionment can be made, it is nonetheless required where more than one offeror or offeree is involved.”

That sentence captures the reality of Florida’s proposal-for-settlement framework: the courts are not focused on whether your offer was sensible in everyday terms—they’re focused on whether it complied with the rule that implements the statute’s purpose of allowing each party to evaluate the offer as it applies to them.

Why the “tenancy by the entireties” argument failed

The court gave several reasons, but the key practical point is simple: a tenancy by the entireties is a form of property ownership, not a legal “party.” It cannot sue or be sued. The Corbetts sued in their individual capacities, and the proposal itself was addressed to them individually—so Rule 1.442(c)(3) applied exactly as written.

Practice tips for both sides

If you’re serving a proposal:

If there is more than one offeree (even spouses), apportion the dollars. If nothing else makes sense, many lawyers will default to a simple split (for example, 50/50), but the core point is that each person must be able to see what portion is “theirs.”
Treat Rule 1.442 as a checklist, not a guideline. This fee remedy is valuable precisely because it’s formula-driven—and that cuts both ways.

If you’re receiving a proposal:

Read it like an auditor. If it’s joint and unapportioned, that defect may defeat a later fee motion—even if the opposing party ultimately wins.
Understanding these technical requirements can meaningfully affect risk analysis and settlement strategy.

Bottom line

Watkins v. Corbett is a straightforward decision with a big takeaway: if you want the leverage of Florida’s proposal-for-settlement statute, you must play by the rules—strictly. Apportionment is not optional, even when it seems pointless, and the courts have repeatedly treated it as a bright-line requirement.

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THIS BLOG IS INTENDED FOR GENERAL INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE. THE READER SHOULD CONSULT WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE LEGAL COUNSEL TO DETERMINE HOW APPLICABLE LAWS APPLY TO SPECIFIC FACTS AND SITUATIONS. BLOG POSTS ARE BASED ON THE MOST CURRENT INFORMATION AT THE TIME THEY ARE WRITTEN. SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE LAWS OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY HAVE CHANGED SINCE PUBLICATION, PLEASE CALL US TO DISCUSS ANY ACTION YOU MAY BE CONSIDERING AS A RESULT OF READING THIS BLOG.

About the Author

Zachary Pearlman, originally from Rockland County, New York, earned his Bachelor’s in American Studies with a focus on the Colonial Era from Ramapo College of New Jersey and interned in the Chambers of Hon. Sandra Sciortino at the New York Supreme Court, Orange County. Currently a 3L at Ave Maria School of Law, he holds a Rewarding Excellence Full Tuition Scholarship, serves as the Managing Editor of the Law Review, and received the Spring 2024 CALI Excellence for the Future Award in Trial Advocacy. Additionally, he is the president of the Saint Thomas More Society, Vice President of the Legion of Mary, and enjoys reading, watching movies, exercising, and bible study.