Associate Attorney
In Meritxell Pons Torres v. A&P Air Conditioning Corporation (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 4, 2026), the Third District Court of Appeal addressed important procedural and substantive limits on granting judgment in a construction lien foreclosure action. The court affirmed the denial of the homeowners’ motion for summary judgment but reversed the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the non-moving contractor.
What happened:
Homeowners contracted with A&P Air Conditioning Corporation to supply and install two air-conditioning units in their apartment for $11,400. They paid a deposit but refused to pay the balance after completion, claiming one unit was installed incorrectly. The contractor recorded a claim of lien and filed a complaint to foreclose it. The homeowners answered, raised a counterclaim for slander of title, and conducted discovery.
The homeowners filed a motion for summary judgment and noticed the hearing solely for their motion. The contractor filed no cross-motion for summary judgment and noticed no other matters for hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied the homeowners’ motion but then sua sponte found that the contractor had substantially performed, entered final judgment for the contractor (including foreclosure of the lien and an award of attorney’s fees), effectively short-circuiting the case.
Appellate holding:
The Third DCA affirmed the denial of the homeowners’ motion for summary judgment. However, it reversed the final judgment entered in favor of the contractor. The court held that the trial court violated Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(f) by granting affirmative relief to the non-moving party without providing notice to the parties and a reasonable opportunity to respond.
Even assuming proper notice had been given, the appellate court ruled that summary judgment was improper on the merits. Under Florida’s construction lien statute, a contractor must establish substantial performance to enforce the lien. The Third DCA emphasized that substantial performance is a question of fact for the trier of fact, not a matter that can ordinarily be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.
The trial court had relied heavily on the fact that the units passed final inspection before the lien was recorded. While the appellate court acknowledged that passing inspection constitutes “solid evidence” of substantial performance, it held that this evidence alone was insufficient to support a finding of substantial performance as a matter of law on the record presented—particularly given the homeowners’ claims regarding defective installation.
Why it matters:
This decision serves as a clear reminder of two key practice points in lien foreclosure and summary judgment proceedings. First, courts cannot grant summary judgment to a non-movant without complying with the notice and opportunity-to-respond requirements of Rule 1.510(f). Second, even strong evidence such as a passed final inspection does not automatically convert substantial performance into a legal question suitable for summary disposition. Disputes over the quality or correctness of the work will almost always create genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved at trial.
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